Q1) Mary Midgley claims that “moral isolationism would lay down a general ban on moral reasoning” (1981/2003, p. 83). How does she justify this claim? Why does Midgley believe that this is sufficiently strong reason for rejecting moral isolationism?
Q2) Moral Relativists would argue that it would be wrong for me (as an American) to criticize the practice of tsujigiri by feudal Japanese Samurai. What is Midgley»s argument that it is neither intolerant nor disrespectful for me (again, as an American) to criticize this foreign practice? On Midgley’s account, what is needed for such criticism to show that I took the Samurai quite seriously without prejudice? (Hint: to answer this last question, consider how Midgley describes a conversation between a critic of tsujigiri and a possible defender of that practice.)
Q3) If Moral Relativism is correct, how does justification in ethics work? In other words, according to Cultural Relativism, what is the “right” way for getting others to agree with you concerning what is morally right and what is morally wrong?
