| CSMP® Level 6 Accredited Diploma | Unit 6 – Perimeter Protection |
For Candidate Use
| Candidate Name | Otsile Gaelebale Moseki |
| Candidate Number | 14706A |
| Submission Date | 30/11/2021 |
AssignmentTutorOnline
Nov 21
For Official Use
| First Assessor Name | William Scarth CSMP® F.ISMI® |
| Internal Verifier Name | Andrea Dobson CSMP® F.ISMI® |
Sep 21
Candidate Declaration
| In submitting this work for assessment, I hereby declare: I have read the Unit text in full. This is my own, individual work. I have not copied the work of other student(s) or engaged another person to write the answers for me. I have not sought assistance from any party other than the ISMI® nominated coach for this unit. Where I have used additional sources (Internet, reference books etc) I have referenced these and not presented them as my original thought. I have not worked together with other student(s) to produce shared answers in whole or in part. I have not shared my answers, verbally or otherwise, in whole, part or draft, with any other student. I have read the Academic Discipline Policy and the Course Terms and Conditions and I understand that the standard penalty for students who violate the rules on academic misconduct is disqualification. |
For Official Use
| Assessor | William Scarth CSMP® F.ISMI® | Dates | |
| Has the candidate met all of the assessment criteria? | Exceeded/Met/Referred/Fail Note: Fail grades awarded to incomplete submissions. Late submissions eligible for met/fail grades only. | 061221 | |
| Overall assessment comment. | You have clearly worked hard at the difficult Unit 6 assessment but need more evidence that the perimeter protection systems and concepts are sufficiently understood. You provide some useful threat data and by adding more analysis here you should be able to develop more compelling risk descriptors. The DBT Task is well handled and you generate correct output covering the required functions. The final design is generally sound and is appropriate for the threat levels. Your specifications are heading in the right direction but adding more detail will more fully evidence a sufficient understanding of the key systems. Take care when copying specifications from the Background Note, for example your fixed CCTV cannot recognise/identify. The performance specifications need to relate to the analysed threats, you do not have a VBIED or PBIED risk. The drawings are basic but sufficient to convey your design intentions. In the final Task you can usefully add more application of relevant principles in analysing your integrated perimeter solution. Doing so should help you evidence the necessary level of understanding. | Assessor Aide Memoire | 061221 |
| 6.1a Geop and SRA 6.1b/c DBT 6.2a Tech and Perf Spec 6.2b Drawings 6.2c Analysis | |||
| List any task numbers that have not met the assessment criteria. | Task 6.1a, 6.2a and 6.2c | 061221 | |
| Summary of required remedial action(s) and resubmission deadline. | Further work is necessary in order for your assignment to meet the assessment criteria. Specifically: Task 6.1a – Provide data concerning threats in the Colo area and include your analysis to critically evaluate the information and turn it into useful intelligence. What crimes/terrorism threats are relevant to the actual site type once in operation (Oil storage/CNI) and actual location within the country? Make it relevant to both the site and the nature of this month’s Unit (perimeter protection). Then develop relevant risks in a correctly worked SRA that has the top 6 risks that the site will face once in operation and that will bring the adversary or their actions into contact with the perimeter. The risks should go further than different methods of gaining access to the facility – what is the motive once inside after compromising the perimeter? Rethink your allocation of likelihood and impact values as if is inconceivable that it will be similar for all risks. Task 6.2a – Review the Unit Textbook, Indicative Content and Chatroom Transcript to gain a deeper understanding of what is required and what can be applied and identify the required perimeter protection elements suitable to defend against the identified risks and threats. Ensure that these elements align with these threats as well as the summary points in 6.1b. Study also Background Note 6.6 for a better understanding of performance specifications and ensure you adapt them in a measurable way to the specific technical specifications, explaining more clearly how they will address the threats. Task 6.2c – Analyse your integrated perimeter design in terms of delay, detection and response times in relation to anticipated penetration times. Review Unit 5 to gain a deeper understanding of how to determine the CDP and how to calculate Tp>Td+Tr. Then apply this accurately to your design as to how the various elements of detection/assessment, delays and response will interact with each other to produce a credible countermeasure to your identified risks, taking into account relevant concepts. Include application of other relevant concepts such as CDP and the area an adversary can cover once inside the fence. Review the SRA controls allocated as the SRA is to be completed based on the assumption that all perimeter defence recommendations are completed. Revise and reconstruct answer(s) in the boxes indicate below each task. Be sure to make full use of the supporting documents and coaching calls. Your revision should begin with a cover-to-cover read of the Unit Textbook and supporting documents. The deadline for resubmission is Monday 7 February 2022. In the case of this revision seek coaching from and submit your revision to [email protected]. |
240122 | |
| Remedial actions log. | |||
| Final assessment comment (if referral). | |||
| Internal Verifier | Andrea Dobson CSMP® F.ISMI® | 16/12/21 | |
| Overall assessment comment. | You have clearly worked hard at this difficult Unit 6 assignment, and with further development through the referrals process you should be able to demonstrate your proficiency in configuring a comprehensive perimeter security concept that will correspond with your risk analysis and express an accurate interpretation of the course materials. You provide some useful threat data and by adding more analysis here you should be able to develop more compelling risk descriptors. The DBT task is well handled and you generate correct output covering the required functions. The final design is generally sound and is appropriate for the threat levels. Your specifications are heading in the right direction, but adding more detail will more fully evidence a sufficient understanding of the key systems. Take care when copying from the background note; for example, your fixed CCTV cannot recognise/identify. Similarly, the performance specifications need to relate to the analysed threats and you do not have a VBIED or PBIED risk. It is important that you assimilate the unit content and then apply it in your own words and relevant to the context that you have developed to demonstrate full understanding. The drawings are basic but sufficient to convey your design intentions. In the final task you can usefully add more application of relevant principles in analysing your integrated perimeter solution. Overall, there is promise in your work, but you have been referred for further development of Tasks 6.1a, 6.2a and 6.2c. | ||
| External Verifier | [EV name] | ||
| Observations. |
For Official Use
| Unit Outcome 6.1 | Be able to develop the security risk analysis to produce a design basis threat. | |
| Assessment Criteria | 6.1a | Produce a typical security risk analysis for a critical national infrastructure site. |
| 6.1b | Synthesise the key elements of the threat assessment process. | |
| 6.1c | Create a design basis threat for the perimeter of a critical national infrastructure site. | |
| Unit Outcome 6.2 | Produce a conceptual design for a facility perimeter. | |
| Assessment Criteria | 6.2a | Produce requirements for perimeter layout and design. |
| 6.2b | Formulate critical requirements in relation to detection, delays and response. | |
| 6.2c | Integrate intrusion detection, illumination and CCTV into the perimeter design requirements. | |
| Unit Outcome 6.3 | Be able to make special perimeter recommendations for critical national infrastructure. | |
| Assessment Criteria | 6.3a | Develop a conceptual perimeter design to be appropriate to a critical national infrastructure site. |
Note: The final assessment criterion, 6.3a, will be achieved in meeting assessment criteria 6.1a to 6.2c
Scenario
Introduction
The Unit tasks are based around a single scenario of a coastal oil storage terminal of strategic national importance. You must apply the assignment to your country or a country you are familiar with – the specific layout of the site should remain as it is presented in the assignment.
Detail and Scenario
Work is underway to move fuel storage facilities from their current location in Bala to a new site in Colo (image left), where the government is aiming to concentrate oil storage to create an energy hub as part of its critical infrastructure plan. Construction is at an advanced stage and the new site is expected to be fully operational within 2 years. It is now time to put in place the final perimeter fence and associated elements.
You have been asked to propose a design concept for the 2,500m perimeter to replace the current temporary fence. This should include appropriate elements of deterrence, detection, delays, surveillance, illumination and response.
Current Site Security
As the site is currently under construction the perimeter comprises a temporary wall/fence which will be dismantled progressively as your proposed design concept is installed. A large contingent of contract guards protects the construction site currently. Upon commissioning this will be replaced with a smaller, dedicated guard force.
Environmental Concerns
Residents in surrounding villages have expressed serious reservations and have held protests about the government’s initiative to concentrate potentially hazardous industries in the same location. There have also been protests over the loss of coastal fishing grounds. Concerns have been exacerbated following an incident in which a tanker hit a jetty near the site. You will need to take this into consideration in your risk analysis, although most of the risk you will analyse will relate to the typical risks of your chosen country setting.
North is at the top of the image. The sea is to the south.
Your Assignment
You are required to produce a design concept for the perimeter of the new site in Colo. This concept will take the form of a risk analysis, design description and supporting drawings. Your design concept should evidence comprehensive understanding and proficient application of the Unit 6 Textbook, so it is essential that this is first read cover to cover and that you seek coaching if there are any areas of the textbook that require clarification.
Specifically, your assignment will include:
- A security risk analysis identifying and analysing the top 6 risks that you assess the site will face once in operation. These risks will be tailored to the country setting you have chosen.
- Two example basis of design models evidencing your understanding of models to analyse adversary characteristics and tactics.
- A perimeter design concept to include deterrence, detection, delays, surveillance, illumination and response.
- Cross-sectional and plan drawings to support the design concept. You are required to superimpose the plan design onto the provided satellite or map site plan image. You should use either of the plan satellite images, provided below. The maps/images are also to be found in the Online Library.
- Validation of your proposed solution through quantified analysis.
You must provide all of the above information in the templates in this workbook.
Important
In the past some students have commenced the task late, or have allocated disproportionate time to individual sections, resulting in an underdeveloped design concept and weak drawings (See Background Briefing Note 6.3). Do be sure to allocate your time accordingly, aim to submit a full draft of the design concept by the draft deadline and make full use of support mechanisms such as coaching calls.
Imagery
For Candidate Use
| Task 6.1a | |
| First, provide a brief overview of your chosen country, identifying prevalent crimes and issues that may impact on a project such as this. This section should be sub-headed. Second, referring back to the process outlined in Unit 1, identify, analyse and assess what you consider to be no less than six security-related risks that in some way would bring adversaries and their actions into contact with the site perimeter. Complete the SRA process as far as the intermediate risk value (IRV) as this will then form the basis for determining the controls necessary. Risks will be specific to country, but suggestions might include: Trespass Criminal damage Activism Theft (burglary) Site occupation Sabotage Terrorism in its various forms Etc A more detailed list of crimes can be found in Background Briefing Note 6.4. Note: Be sure to expand the descriptors to include the 3As. |
First Part Country Overview BOTSWANA Botswana is a politically stable, landlocked country found in the southern part of Africa.it has two cities, the capita; city is Gaborone at which most of the developments and services are found. The country has an estimated population of 3million citizens making it one of the smallest population in the world. The oil site will be in the capital city, Gaborone. This is the most industrious part of the country, unfortunately it is also having high levels of crime. Due to it being in the capital city, amnesties and services required will be ease of reach as the country s leadership is also in the capital. The oil storage site is of national interest; failure of the site will impact most sectors of the economy. We need oil and its product for movement of goods (import and exports), daily transportation of public to work, school, tourist destinations and to get services. Crime Overview Corruption: According to CPI2014_Results.xlsx (live.com) Corruption perception index 2014 Botswana is ranked number 31 least corrupt country out of 175 countries, this means there are instances of corruption ,it may be to a small scale but it is there. The results also show that the country has dropped two places down since 2012. This means that there was an increase in corruption instances in the country therefore this means that corruption is increasing within the country. Gaborone as the capital city of the country has most cases of corruption due to it being highly populated, and providing many private and government services. This means corruption is likely to be evident within the oil site storage as well. As a result of corruption the government and companies lose money and more money is spent to combat it. In most cases people engage in corrupt practises for financial gains. Therefore, this shows that there is likelihood of security detail posted to the oil site perimeter to engage in corrupt practices so as to gain financially. Robbery: there are rising cases of illegal entries to people’s properties, taking people’s valuable by force in the area. This is brought on by the high numbers of unemployment. A culprit may have to ask themselves the following questions before they commit the crime (U2,p14): Will I be seen? This will prompt the potential criminal to create conditions to not be seen committing the crime, thus they will find ways to enter the premises without being seen. And to enter mostly at a time when there will be less people around thus at night or on a weekend when most staff is off. Therefore, it will be important to install perimeter intrusion detectors. (U6,p20,21) If I’m seen, will I be noticed? If someone see them going into the oil site will they notice their intentions and will they notice them committing the crime. Therefore, the adversary will plan to not get noticed, therefore it will be imperative to put good lighting and CCTV to monitor movement around the perimeter. If I’m seen and noticed, will anyone react? When they are caught red handed doing the criminal act, how will those who catch him react? This prompts the security department to plan for a quick response system. Hijacking/ theft of vehicles: there is an increase of hijacking vehicles. in most cases the cars stolen and hijacked are used for criminal purposes or sold. In most cases the vehicles used during robberies are stolen vehicles, after the robbery the vehicles are usually dumped in the wilderness. This means that there is likelihood that the culprits may use the stolen vehicles to steal from the oil site, and escape using them. Armed robberies: there is an increase of armed robberies due to high loss of jobs, businesses and high rates of unemployment. the culprits are looking for ways to make money therefore they may want to steal oil or any other equipment from the site so as to sell to make a living. Activism: during 2020 lockdown due to COVID-19, there was an increase in Gender based violence (GBV) and defilement. as a result, there is an outcry from the community for the government to react. Non-government organisations are on the forefront calling for the government to put measures in place to address it, they held marches, which contravened the COVID-19 protocols. that why some people were detained by the police. The first Lady of the country embarked on a nationwide tour to involve community leaders, community at large, law enforcement in communities to come up with strategies to combat the issue. This shows that the community have an impact on government decisions this means that the community/ environmental protestors will not shy away from communicating their concerns, communicating their concerns may not follow the bureaucratic channels as that may take a long time for the government to react. Therefore, they may protest to bring attention to the oil site storage. Tertiary students usually strike when their allowances get credited late. They don’t attend classes and break windows and get aggressive to a point where the law enforcement has to be called. This means the if the marches will be spearheaded by youth/tertiary students there is likelihood of damage to properties. Therefore, this means that the protestors (local community and disgruntled fisherman) are likely to damage the oil site facility during their march/demonstration. Criminal damage: most of the robberies that take place the culprits use force to enter e.g. break windows, door, therefore there is likelihood of the culprits damaging the fence of the oil site in order to get inside. This means in order to gain access to the oil site the culprits will likely damage the perimeter, Therefore, there is need for devises that will detect any damages to the fence. . Second Part Nr Risk Descriptor [be sure to identify adversary, asset and action in each descriptor] Likelihood Impact IRV #1 Environmental protestors cutting the fence in order to gain entry into the oil site storage. 3 2 low #2 Cutting the padlock at the gate by the protestors/ culprits indoor to gain access into the oil site storage 3 2 low #3 Environmental protesters/culprits lifting the skirt of the perimeter fence in order to gain access into the oil site storage 3 2 low #4 Destruction of intrusion and detection devices installed on the perimeter by the adversary 3 2 low #5 Throwing equipment over the fence by the workers 3 2 low #6 Culprits/ protestors burrowing under the perimeter fence in order to gain entry into the oil site storage facility 3 2 low |
| Revised answer here First Part Country Overview
Second Part Nr Risk Descriptor [be sure to identify adversary, asset and action in each descriptor] Likelihood Impact IRV #1 #2 #3 #4 #5 #6 |
|
| For Official Use |
| Task 6.1a Assessor Comments | |
| Grade | Exceeded/Met/Referred/Fail (highlight as appropriate) |
| Comments | Not much application and analysis in Part 1 and the SRA is not well developed. Risk descriptors need to be more precise and correctly worded. Analysis does not suggest all Ls are 3 and all Is are 2. |
| Remedial actions by candidate (if required) | Provide data concerning threats in the Colo area and include your analysis to critically evaluate the information and turn it into useful intelligence. What crimes/terrorism threats are relevant to the actual site type once in operation (Oil storage/CNI) and actual location within the country? Make it relevant to both the site and the nature of this month’s Unit (perimeter protection). Then develop relevant risks in a correctly worked SRA that has the top 6 risks that the site will face once in operation and that will bring the adversary or their actions into contact with the perimeter. The risks should go further than different methods of gaining access to the facility – what is the motive once inside after compromising the perimeter? Rethink your allocation of likelihood and impact values as if is inconceivable that it will be similar for all risks. |
| Comments after remedial actions |
For Candidate Use
The following task is designed to meet two assessment criteria, 6.1b and 6.1c.
| Task 6.1b/c | |
| Unit 1 introduced you to the threat assessment process and some typical adversary/asset/action questions that might be asked (Unit 1, Page 18). Developing this concept further, a useful tool when determining design requirements is the Design Basis Threat (DBT). The concept of the DBT was introduced in Unit 5, and has been further discussed throughout Unit 6. You will find essential information in Background Briefing Notes 6.1 and 6.5. The DBT is a detailed description of the adversary methods and capabilities that relate specifically to the security element that we are designing, and concludes with summary design recommendations. In this case we are designing a perimeter, so the DBT helps us analyse how the adversary will interact with the perimeter. This will then help us to produce a good countermeasures design. There are many alternative approaches to DBT and one such is presented to the right under the heading First Part. Your Task First, select any one of your security risk analysis descriptors from the preceding SRA task and analyse the associated adversary characteristics and capabilities using the first template. Your analysis should culminate with a set of perimeter security recommendations that should match the characteristics of the adversary and which should be referenced to the Unit Textbook. Second, select the same adversary/risk descriptor and this time create a DBT template of your own using what you consider to be the most appropriate 12 questions from the lists in Background Briefing Note 6.5. You should add answers to your selected questions and your analysis should culminate with a set of perimeter security recommendations that should match the characteristics of the adversary and which should be referenced to the Unit Textbook.Use the template (right) under the heading Second Task for this purpose. Third, consider both of the templates you have used and explain which you believe produces the best analysis, adding the reasons for your choice. You will need to produce about 200-300 words if your analysis is to be sufficient. |
First Part Adversary Environment protestors Cross Reference to SRA Profile R#1 cutting of perimeter fence by environmental protestors. Description and Typical Profile Protestors are roughly between the ages of 18-45. Most protestors are from non-governmental organisations such as Somarele tikologo(conserve the environment). They want to get heard. Previously the government did not consider their concerns on opening hunting, therefore this time they want the government to notice and listen to them. Anticipated Numbers/Strength 30-40 people but the numbers peak to hundreds on weekend. Motive (According to the SRA) To cause damage to the perimeter disrupt operations so as to grab attention of the management, the leadership of the country and disrupt daily operations. Motivation and Determination Highly motivated and determined to see the project fail. Sophistication and Technical Ability Adversaries are influential to the community, they are able to lobby support from locals and international community. Typical Actions against the Perimeter Damage and destroy the perimeter and the PIDS, harass workers, block the perimeter entry and exit points. (U6,p15) Anticipated Location of Action The activity is expected to take place at the entrance and along fence at the anterior of the site. Anticipated Time (Day/Night/Weekend) The protest is expected to take place during the day, during the week when all management of the site are available because the protest is to provoke them to shut down. Level of Anticipated Aggression Protesters are usually not aggressive but the younger protesters get aggressive when approached with force or intimidated. Anticipated Tools, Equipment and Vehicles Shovels, logs ,tree branches, burning tyres to block entrances and intimidate workers Anticipated Weapons No lethal weapons anticipated Anticipated Insider Assistance Not likely but the possibility cannot be ruled out. Detailed Description of Anticipated Damage to Perimeter and Perimeter Elements Vigorously shaking the fence, cutting through the fence and burrowing under. Arising from the above, summary points on desired design requirements for the perimeter. [These should be summary (bullet point) perimeter recommendations based on your analysis of the adversary described above. In order to do this proficiently, you will need to have read the Unit Textbook cover to cover and have assimilated and understood the key content] Erect a 358 standard 6m welded mesh, with rotating spikes anti climb topping to make it hard for the protestors to jump over the fence or throw down the fence (U6,p35) Fence should have concrete foundation of 1m depth to avoid lift skirt and burrowing. (U6,p18) Gate should match the strength and height of the fence, and manned, Gates to be padlocked with a high-security closed shackle padlock fitted on a steel sliding locking bar. (U6,56) Install fibre optic cable to detect intrusion (U6,p43) Install fixed CCTV around the perimeter supported by fewer (PTZ) at 50m intervals along perimeter 5m above the ground Install controlled lighting as it does not cause light pollution and disturbance, 10m from fence and 45m apart. (U6,p49) Maintain a sterile zone 3m from fence (internal and external), for clear surveillance by patrolling guards, and avoid the bushes interfering with intrusion detection systems (U6,p21) Put up signage to inform public that the site is under CCTV surveillance, loitering is prohibited (U6,p25) Guards patrol to include inspection of the perimeter fence (U6,p26) A reaction force onsite dedicated response force will always be on standby thereby increasing the response time.(U6,p20) Second Part Third Part |
| Task 6.1b/c Assessor Comments | |
| Grade | Exceeded/Met/Referred/Fail (highlight as appropriate) |
| Comments | OK application of DBT method. |
| Remedial actions by candidate (if required) | None. |
| Comments after remedial actions |
For Candidate Use
| Task 6.2a |
| Having read the Unit Textbook cover to cover, your task is now to produce a design concept for the perimeter of this site. This must mitigate all of the risks in the Task 6.1a risk analysis table, orat least those rated moderate IRV and above. You will begin by providing an outline description of each perimeter element. For example, under surveillance you should include CCTV and you may wish to add other elements such as patrolling, watchtowers etc. Under detection you should evidence correct selection and application of at least one form of dedicated PIDS, but you might like to add as a second example video motion detection or patrolling officers etc. Delays will comprise fences, gates etc. In columns two and three you will then build on your outline description with detailed technical and performance specifications. In the technical column this may include height of the perimeter, gauge of the wire, number, spacing and kind of cameras, zoning of PIDS, illumination level and spacing of lamps etc. Your information should be sufficient for a contractor to interpret your requirement accurately. In the performance column you will state what your perimeter elements are designed to do. For example, the delay time afforded to your barriers, the sensing performance parameters of your PIDS, the purpose of your CCTV (surveil, detect, recognise, identify, provide evidence etc.). You will need a full understanding of both Units 5 and 6 in order to be able to complete this satisfactorily. Background Briefing Note 6.6 (Online Library) will help you in this regard. Hint: If you have your security risk analysis printed out at your side you will be able to produce a better tailored solution. |
| [The number of rows provided is for guidance; you don’t have to use every one in each subsection if you don’t need to. Conversely, you may add more if you wish] Perimeter Elements Outline Description of Requirement TechnicalSpecifications (you will need a detailed assimilation and understanding of the Unit Textbook and there should be full page referencing) Desired Performance Specifications (you will need a full understanding of Units 5 and 6 in order to be able to complete this. Strong answers will be expansive, applying performance requirements back to specific risks in the risk analysis). Surveillance Fixed cameras on the perimeter fence (U6, p46). 50 x Fixed cameras Cameras of standard 8mm focal length lens with a ⅓ inch Mounted at 50m intervals along the perimeter fence line Mounted on 5m high poles all facing the same clockwise direction (U6, P45, P46) Fitted with VMD software. To allow for alarm assessment. To provide accurate information relating to strength, direction and nature of intruders to a response force. To augment intrusion detection. To deter potential adversaries. To detect movement when combined with motion detection To track movement (PTZ only). To record evidence. To detect abnormal activity around the perimeter. To monitor activity around the perimeter. To recognise (known persons) or to identify (unknown persons) – but only within very specific parameters. PTZ cameras inside the perimeter 12 x PTZ cameras of standard lens at least 2m inside the perimeter fence spaced 200m apart and mounted 5m above the ground. The PTZ automatically pan, tilt and zoom to follow the movements of a suspect (U6, P47) attached to the fence line at a 1m height from the ground. detect acoustic variations in the fence caused by climbing or cutting. Security officers 1. 8 to 10 guards per shift patrolling the perimeter on foot. 2. they should be equipped with radios, batons and torches. 3. There should be a standby vehicle in cases of emergency. 4. The guards are to be accommodated at the gate house located at the main entrance. Patrol the perimeter fence to detect any abnormalities around the fence. Monitor all movements around fence at all times. 2.4m high, 358-standard welded mesh with a rotating spike anti-climb topping mounted back-to-back in a double skinned configuration with small apertures, covering a perimeter of 2,500m (U6, P35). 1m depth (cast in place foundation) To define, demarcate and delineate the property boundary. To deter undetermined adversaries . To delay determined adversaries climbing, burrowing, cutting through or lifting skirt for up To deflect (or displace) adversaries To delay the adversary to allow for assessment. To protect personnel Impede small VBIEDs . To channel persons to control points. To channel adversaries into pre-planned neutralisation zones. To channel PBIEDs through legitimate access points. To provide a stable platform for PIDS. To reduce the risk of accidental activation of buried and pedestal-mounted PIDS. To provide evidence of forced entry. To reduce the number of entry/exit points. To facilitate the effective use of security personnel. Perimeter gate (U6, P57). 2.4m (same height as fence) Double leaf gates and have steel bolt padlocked into steel sheathed hole in concrete. Gate to be topped with razor wire coils. Gaps beneath the gate should not exceed 100mm, but ideally not more than 50mm when gate is closed (U6, P56). The gate is to act as a legitimate point of entrance and exit. It will help facilitate both vehicle access control and individual personnel access to the facility (U6, P55). Response Onsite dedicated response security guards 8 to 10 guards per shift patrolling the perimeter on foot. they should be equipped with radios, batons and torches. There should be a standby vehicle in cases of emergency. The guards are to be accommodated at the gate house located at the main entrance. Guards must be able to respond in the shortest period of time from any detection reported through the Fibre Optic Cable and CCTV. The aim is that the response should be effective such that it must be completed before action has been completed and ideally before penetration of the fence has taken place. As such, time of penetration must be greater than time of detection and time of response- Tp>Td + Tr (U5, P26). Illumination Additional Site Work Elements, if Applicable (clear zones, ditches, berms, jersey barriers etc.) At the entrance with clearly visible font and colour Placed at the entrances of the facility and around the facilty. For Official Use |
Revised answer here
| Perimeter Elements | Outline Description of Requirement | TechnicalSpecifications (you will need a detailed assimilation and understanding of the Unit Textbook and there should be full page referencing) | Desired Performance Specifications (you will need a full understanding of Units 5 and 6 in order to be able to complete this. Strong answers will be expansive, applying performance requirements back to specific risks in the risk analysis). |
| Surveillance | |||
| Detection | |||
| Delays | |||
| Response | |||
| Illumination | |||
| Additional Site Work Elements, if Applicable (clear zones, ditches, berms, jersey barriers etc.) | |||
| Task 6.2a Assessor Comments | |
| Grade | Exceeded/Met/Referred/Fail (highlight as appropriate) |
| Comments | Design is basically OK although microphones probably not a good idea (and says fibre in Task 6.2c). Specs lacking in areas and in others are just cut and paste from BN 6.6, sometimes not correct for the system. Also talks of threats not listed in the SRA (VBIED and PBIED for example). Overall, gives an impression that the key systems are not yet fully understood. |
| Remedial actions by candidate (if required) | Review the Unit Textbook, Indicative Content and Chatroom Transcript to gain a deeper understanding of what is required and what can be applied and identify the required perimeter protection elements suitable to defend against the identified risks and threats. Ensure that these elements align with these threats as well as the summary points in 6.1b. Study also Background Note 6.6 for a better understanding of performance specifications and ensure you adapt them in a measurable way to the specific technical specifications, explaining more clearly how they will address the threats. |
| Comments after remedial actions |
| Task 6.2b | |
| First, produce a cross-sectional drawing of your perimeter to indicate all elements relating to surveillance, detection, delays, assessment, illumination etc. Example drawings are available in the Library and your attention is drawn to Background Briefing Note 6.3 |
| Second, support all of your perimeter specifications with a detailed plan drawing of the facility, indicating where static perimeter protective elements are to be deployed. You may do this by hand, PowerPoint, or any other tool that you have the ability to use, but please then ensure that the finished plan drawing is copied into the space below. It is not recommended that you redraw the site from scratch but instead superimpose your concept onto one of the two images previously provided, pasted into the space below this box. Note the scale of the site. You should ensure that your security elements match the scale. For example, if you specify cameras at 50m intervals these should be represented on the plan drawing. |
| For Official Use |
| Task 6.2b Assessor Comments | |
| Grade | Exceeded/Met/Referred/Fail (highlight as appropriate) |
| Comments | Very basic but just meets AC. |
| Remedial actions by candidate (if required) | None. |
| Comments after remedial actions |
| Task 6.2c | |
| First, provide an analysis of how detection/assessment, delays and response will interact with each other to produce a credible countermeasure to your identified risks. You will need to refer back to Unit 5 to produce a good answer, evidencing understanding of Unit 5 (Page 73) concepts such as the Critical Detection Point and Tp>Td + Tr. Second, copy your security risk analysis from Task 6.1a into the box opposite and add to the analysis the values for controls and priority, based on the countermeasures you have recommended in the preceding sections. |
Detection, Assessment, Delays and Response Analysis Detection, Assessment, Delays and Response Analysis From a cost and business perspective any security system should be designed to detect. Detection is better when it takes place before an undesirable event rather than after. As such early detection of an adversary is essential. Early detection at the site perimeter increases the available response force time after detection. The best system is that which provides the earliest detection, and strong delays can significantly assist in assuring that detection takes place, and that there is sufficient time to detect it effectively. Detection is more than just sensing adversary action. For effective interdiction the information communicated to the response force should include details of the adversary such as, strength, nature and sophistication, weapons, direction of travel and indication of the intended adversary action and target. Detection should always be augmented by assessment and the most common form of assessment is video surveillance (CCTV). (U5, P22). According to ( U5, P23) delays provide time for detection to take place. Terms such as delay and barrier go hand in hand as they deduce of an ability to prevent an adversary action. Types of barriers include fences, guards, employee activity, signage. Ideally, a security system should be designed to defeat an adversary, but assurance of defeat is often very difficult to achieve. The delay should be sufficient not only to allow for assessment, but also to hold back the adversary at the point of detection until the intervention of a response force to neutralise the adversary. In relation to the risks identified at the oil storage facility, the welded mesh with rotating spike anti climb topping erected with concrete base beneath the surface of the ground and a 2.4m (height) a double leaf gates effectively topped with razor wire coils and a steel bolt padlocked into a steel sheathed hole in concrete should be enough to delay the adversary and increasing the time the adversary will take to penetrate the perimeter (Tp). Upon detecting any tempering with the welded mesh, the fibre Optic cables and the CCTV incorporated with VMD should be able to detect (Td) and pinpoint the exact position on the perimeter fence where the adversary is intending to penetrate. The information captured will then be relayed to the main control room for assessment which inturn will respond appropriately looking at the numbers, skill and weapons of the adversary and send the response team where needed hence reducing response time (Tr). Principle 8 (U5, P53) of the core principles of security design states that the time of penetration must be greater than time of detection plus time of response (Tp˃Td +Tr). According to U5, P53 in order to satisfy this equation any one, or all, of the component elements may be influenced, for example: Increasing time of penetration- use of 2.4 m height climb resistant welded mesh with rotating anti climb toppings can delay an intruder penetration time, Fence fabric embedded into concrete base to eliminate skirting and burrowing and patrol guards to assess, detect, delay and disrupt any intruder. Improving time of detection- fibre optics cable embedded on the perimeter fence to alert and improve detection and for easy tracking of intruder movement, CCTV field of view to extend beyond perimeter. Patrolling, CCTV linked to fibre optic cable for immediate assessment, response team immediately available for assessment. Improving time of response- Quick reaction force, patrolling and dogs and use of appropriate response transport For example it would take a determined adversary 0.2 seconds to sprint through the 3 meters clear zone to the welded mesh fence, then 0.2 seconds of 3 meters clear zone inside then walk 15m for 10 seconds to the oil containers as such the time taken to detect (Td) adversary activity along the perimeter fence and the time taken to assess and send out the response (Tr) team should be lesser, in essence the time of penetration should be greater to allow for detection and response
Risk Descriptor [be sure to identify adversary, asset and action in each descriptor] Likelihood Impact IRV Controls Priority #1 Cutting the padlock at the gate by the protestors/ culprits indoor to gain access into the oil site storage |
| Revised answer here Detection, Assessment, Delays and Response Analysis Nr Risk Descriptor [be sure to identify adversary, asset and action in each descriptor] Likelihood Impact IRV Controls Priority #1 #2 #3 #4 #5 #6 |
| For Official Use |
| Task 6.2c Assessor Comments | |
| Grade | Exceeded/Met/Referred/Fail (highlight as appropriate) |
| Comments | Lacks consistency for example talks of fibre optic cables but microphones specified. Application of Tp etc is weak and clearly the key concepts not yet fully understood. |
| Remedial actions by candidate (if required) | Analyse your integrated perimeter design in terms of delay, detection and response times in relation to anticipated penetration times. Review Unit 5 to gain a deeper understanding of how to determine the CDP and how to calculate Tp>Td+Tr. Then apply this accurately to your design as to how the various elements of detection/assessment, delays and response will interact with each other to produce a credible countermeasure to your identified risks, taking into account relevant concepts. Include application of other relevant concepts such as CDP and the area an adversary can cover once inside the fence. Review the SRA controls allocated as the SRA is to be completed based on the assumption that all perimeter defence recommendations are completed. |
| Comments after remedial actions |
The post work for assessment appeared first on My Blog.